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Abstract—In this paper we compare two pricing rules in the
context of bandwidth trade. Allocation and pricing rules, to-
gether with a set of signals received from independent agents,
constitute a market mechanism. In the paper we analyze two
pricing rules: well known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves rule (VCG)
and the parametric pricing rule (PPR). We apply these pricing
rules to the allocation rule specified by the balancing commu-
nication bandwidth trade model (BCBT).
Keywords—communication bandwidth trade, mechanism de-
sign, pricing rule.
1. Introduction
Bandwidth market, in the context of independent traders
(in this paper we will call them agents), determines a game
among these agents. The ﬁnite group of agents interacts.
The set of agents is denoted I = {1,2, . . . ,n} and generic
agent is represented as i. Every agent tries to maximize her
individual proﬁts. Thus, the aims of particular agents are
inconsistent. However, the market designer can inﬂuence
the behavior of particular agents by applying speciﬁc rules
to the game. Thus, the market designer tries to achieve
the overriding goals. In the context of market games, such
rules are allocation and pricing rules. Applying this speciﬁc
rules to the game among independent agents results in the
market mechanism.
Every agent is characterized by her preferences. We call
this preferences the agent’s type Ti. We usually assume
that the agent knows only her type, but not those of other
agents. The mechanism designer also does not know
agents’ types. We call such mechanism informationally de-
centralized [1].
Agent reports the signal θi to the mechanism. The signal,
in the context of market mechanism, can be understood as
a buying/selling oﬀer. Signal is reported on the basis of
the strategy function. The strategy function depends on the
agent’s type, behavior of the other agents and on the mech-
anism rules. Thus, the signal reported by the particular
agent, can diﬀers from this agent’s type.
The allocation rule determines the allocation of the of-
fers. It divides the oﬀers for the accepted (also partially
accepted) and rejected. Pricing rule sets a vector of prices
for traded commodities. The mechanism receives the sig-
nals from particular agents and performs the allocation of
commodities and determines their valuation – in accordance
with the allocation and pricing rules.
2. Desired Mechanisms Properties
Mechanism is constructed in order to fulﬁll the desired
results. Particular agents try to achieve their maximal indi-
vidual proﬁts, thus their goals are inconsistent. Moreover,
goals of particular agents are also inconsistent with global
goals, desired by the mechanism designer. Mechanism the-
ory considers the set of the most desired properties.The
most important mechanism properties are: incentive com-
patibility, individual rationality, Pareto-eﬃciency and bud-
get balance [2].
Incentive compatibility property holds if no agent has
incentives to report signal diﬀerent from her type. In the
other words, the incentive compatibility property holds,
if no agent has incentives to report untruthful oﬀer. Mech-
anism is individually rational, if no agent loses from
participation in such mechanism. Such property is also
called the voluntary participation property. The voluntary
participation property means that if agent loses she can
choose not to participate in given mechanism. Results of
the mechanism are Pareto-eﬃcient, if we can not improve
results (i.e., payment) for one agent without making re-
sults for some other agents worse oﬀ. In the other words,
mechanism results are Pareto-eﬃcient if such a results
are not Pareto-dominated by other results. Mechanism has
balanced budget if sum of sellers expenses is equal to
sum of buyers incomes. In the other words, mechanism is
budget balanced, if there is no need to surcharge mech-
anism, and the mechanism does not give us additional
proﬁts.
The most desired mechanism should fulﬁll all listed prop-
erties. However, several theorems [3]–[5] (so called im-
possibility theorems) states, that it is impossible that single
mechanism holds all properties. Therefore, we need to de-
cide for the subset of desired mechanism properties, which
should hold for considered mechanisms.
In the following parts of the paper, we introduce and com-
pare two mechanisms for the bandwidth trade problems.
These mechanisms are Pareto-eﬃcient, individually ratio-
nal and incentive compatible. However, we allow for the
lack of budget balance.
3. Mechanisms Review
Many papers deal with the bandwidth trade problems. We
will describe a number of them using the mechanism theory
terminology.
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In this section we review the variety of bandwidth trading
mechanisms presented in the literature. There are three
classes of such approaches:
– simultaneous, single link auctions [6], [7] – here we
discuss the most recent mechanism MIDAS [6];
– combinatorial auctions [8], [9], with the c-SeBiDA
combinatorial double auction as a good representa-
tive;
– the family of multicommodity market models (M3 ),
with basic BCBT market model [10].
3.1. Simultaneous, Single Link Auctions
In the simultaneous, separate auctions for individual links
an agent that wants to buy a certain path must put simul-
taneous bids at all relevant auctions. Then special, itera-
tive mechanisms are required to coordinate individual links.
This aspect, as well as possible suboptimality are the main
roots of our criticisms for these methods. The review of
the auction mechanisms dealing with the problem of coor-
dination of simultaneous, single link auctions is presented
in [6]. Authors point out several drawbacks of already pro-
posed mechanism, such as the convergence problem and
lack of incentive for submitting truthful bids. In the [6]
the simultaneous multi-unit Dutch auction one for each
link mechanism (MIDAS) is proposed. The allocation rule
of the MIDAS derives from the generalized Vickrey auc-
tion [11], but is carried out by the simultaneous Dutch auc-
tions. The payment rule of the mechanism is equivalent to
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payment rule. However, we have to
remember that incentive compatibility property is satisﬁed
only when allocation rule is eﬃcient, which is not always
true in the case of MIDAS mechanism. Thus, even thought
the mechanism may seem to be simple and scalable, the
complicated synchronization, that requires full information
makes it impractical in our opinion.
3.2. Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions are designed for trading on depen-
dent commodities. One particular auction model that ap-
pears in the context of bandwidth market is the combi-
natorial seller’s bid double auctions (c-SeBiDA) [8]. The
c-SeBiDA considers two types of commodities: inter-node
links and paths consisting of particular links. Agents may
bid a single link or a bundle of links constituting spe-
ciﬁc path. Allocation rule ensures that the same indivis-
ible amount of bandwidth is assigned to all links consti-
tuting buyers path, thus a buyer has no risk of buying dif-
ferent amount of bandwidth on some required links. The
c-SeBiDA auction has several valuable properties, such as
the maximization of the global economic wealth. How-
ever, similarly to the approaches concerning on simultane-
ous auctions, buyers bids must specify the particular links
that constitute a desired path. This may lead to welfare in-
eﬃciency. Welfare ineﬃciency corresponds to a situation
where the social welfare obtained is not maximum possi-
ble to reach – we can imagine the allocation rule, which
allocates resources in a better way.
The c-SeBiDA mechanism is individually rational. Its re-
sults are Pareto-eﬃcient and it has balanced budget. How-
ever, such a mechanism does not hold incentive compati-
bility property – particular agents can derive unreasonable
proﬁts from this mechanism.
3.3. Multicommodity Market Models
In the multicommodity auction models, the eﬃcient mar-
ket balance is obtained in the eﬀect of joint optimization
of many elementary buy and sell oﬀers. Multicommodity
means that market entities can trade with bundles (pack-
ages) of diﬀerent commodities. The balancing communi-
cation bandwidth trade (BCBT) model proposed in [10]
allows bidders to place buy oﬀers not only for bundled
links, but rather for end-to-end connections. Therefore, no
buyer does not have to know which links to choose to best
allocate the demanded capacity. It is the decision model
that allocates the most eﬃcient links to paths.
We assume that the communication network consists of
nodes connected by links. The inter-node link represents
a network resource (bandwidth), that can be an elementary
commodity oﬀered for sale on the bandwidth market. How-
ever, network resources being traded can be more complex
and can be composed of many parallel links, or end-to-end
node connections represented by paths or subnetworks.
Each buy oﬀer concerns a point-to-point bandwidth con-
nection between a pair of speciﬁed locations in a commu-
nication network. The locations form the set of network
nodes V . The connections (and links) are unidirectional,
i.e., they have source and sink nodes.
The objective of BCBT model is the maximization of total
economic welfare Eq. (1), which is the total surplus of all
buyers and sellers. Constraints (2) and (3) set upper and
lower bounds on particular network links (xe) and partic-
ular end-to-end network demands (xd). The non-negative
variable xed constraint (4) is interpreted as a bandwidth
capacity allocated to network link e to serve end-to-end
demand d. Also, the sum of capacities allocated to all
network demands ∑d∈D xed served by particular network
link e, should not exceed the realization xe of the link con-
straint (5). Finally, the sum of all capacities, provided with
incidence matrix ave, allocated to all network links, serving
particular network demand, should not exceed the realiza-
tion of the end-to-end demand xd Eq. (6):
ˆQ = max
(
∑
d∈D
Edxd − ∑
e∈E
Sexe
)
, (1)
subject to:
0 ≤ xd ≤ hd , ∀d ∈D , (2)
0 ≤ xe ≤ ye, ∀e ∈ E , (3)
∑
d∈D
xed ≤ xe, ∀e ∈ E , (4)
0 ≤ xed , ∀e ∈ E , ∀d ∈D , (5)
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∑
e∈E
avexed =


xd v = sd
0 v 6= sd ,td
−xd v = td
,∀v ∈ V ,∀d ∈D , (6)
where:
indices:
d ∈D buy oﬀers – demands for bandwidth,
v ∈ V network nodes,
e ∈ E sell oﬀers – network resources;
parameters:
ave = 1 if link e originates in node v,
=−1 if e terminates in node v,
= 0 otherwise,
sd source node for demand d,
td sink node for demand d,
hd required capacity of demand d,
Ed oﬀered unit price for demand d,
ye oﬀered capacity of network link e,
Se oﬀered unit price for network link e;
variables:
xed bandwidth ﬂow serving demand d allocated to net-
work link e,
xd contracted bandwidth capacity for demand d,
xe contracted bandwidth capacity for network link e.
The xe and xd are, respectively, values of realized band-
width on the link e and on the demand d. They are also
the accepted oﬀers for link e and demand d – in the BCBT
model sell oﬀers correspond network links and buy oﬀers
correspond demand paths resulting in a multigraph.
As stated before, we will identify oﬀerers with agents, and
the submitted oﬀers with signals send to mechanism. Be-
cause single oﬀer relates to single link or single path, we
can identify the oﬀers with the network resources. Thus,
let us deﬁne the set of agents as the sum of the sets
I = E ∪D . Also let us deﬁne the signal θi sent by the
ith agent as the tuple: oﬀered price and oﬀered capacity.
When ith agent represents bandwidth seller, such tuple is
equal to θi =< Si,yi >, otherwise such tuple is equal to
θi =< Ei,hi >. Also the allocation results we will denote
as x = (x1, · · · ,xi, · · · ,xn).
Let us note that the BCBT model does not deﬁne any pric-
ing rule, it deﬁnes only allocation rule. So we will treat
the BCBT model as the allocation rule. This also applies
to other bandwidth trade models from the BCBT family.
Therefore, we need to propose the pricing rules to the base
BCBT allocation rule. As the result we obtain two market
mechanisms presented in the next sections.
4. Analyzed Pricing Rules
As we stated before, we analyze and compare two pricing
rules in the context of bandwidth trade. These rules are the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) rule (mechanism) and the
parametric pricing rule (PPR).
4.1. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Pricing Rule
VCG pricing rule – or rather VCG mechanism was intro-
duced in the papers [12]–[14]. VCG mechanism does not
deﬁne allocation rule, it only states that applying VCG pric-
ing rule to eﬃcient allocation rule creates VCG mechanism.
An allocation rule is said to be eﬃcient if it maximizes
“social welfare”, treated as the aggregation of particular
agents’ utility functions. Thus, the BCBT is an eﬃcient
allocation rule.
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume, that every agent
submits one oﬀer. VCG pricing rule sets payoﬀ for every
agent. Payoﬀ for ith agent is deﬁned as the opportunity
cost that the presence of ith agent introduces to all other
agents.
Set of agents sends a vector of signals θ = (θ1, · · · ,θn)
to the mechanism. Let us deﬁne vector θ−i =(θ1, · · · ,θi−1,
θi+1, · · · ,θn), which contains the set of all signals but sig-
nal θi. The Q(θ ) is the economic welfare obtained by the
allocation rule with all the signals θ . The Q(θ−i) is the
economic welfare, obtained by the allocation rule without
ith signal. So, the payment for ith agent is equal to:
Ii = Q(θ )−Q(θ−i) (7)
We can determine prices for each agent (if her oﬀer is
accepted). If the agent i submitted the selling oﬀer, the
price for her is equal to Eq. (8), otherwise, the buying
price for ith agent is equal to Eq. (9). Prices for agents
which oﬀers were rejected are negligible.
piSi =
Sixi + Ii
xi
, (8)
piKi =
Eixi− Ii
xi
. (9)
Applying the VCG pricing rule to the BCBT allocation
rule results in the VCG mechanism. Properties of such
mechanism are as follows: it fulﬁlls incentive compatibil-
ity property, results of the mechanism are Pareto-eﬃcient,
individual rationality is also fulﬁlled. Unfortunately, there
is a lack of budget balance.
4.2. Parametric Pricing Rule
Second considered pricing rule is the parametric pricing
rule [15]. This rule sets prices accordingly to modiﬁed
Vickrey double auction (MVDA) [16]. The MVDA mecha-
nism was designed for double auction with indivisible com-
modities. It sets the diﬀerentiated buying and selling prices
in such a way, that there is no agent, which has incentives
to deviate from her type.
Parametric pricing rule uses parametric analysis performed
in the respect to the mathematical model of the allocation
rule. Parametric analysis is based on repeatedly performed
sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis also is performed
in the respect to the mathematical model of the allocation
rule. Sensitivity analysis provides us with results, which
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tell us how much the ith oﬀer price can be changed without
changing the commodities allocation. Let us denote results
performed in step κ of parametric analysis as s(κ),+ for the
selling prices, and as e(κ),− for the buying prices.
Given ith price (for the sake of simplicity let us assume
that it is selling price) is increased of the value s
(κ),+
i + ε
(where 0 < ε ≪ 1). Afterwards, the allocation model is
solved again and the allocation of the commodities changes.
Particular steps of parametric analysis set more beneﬁcial
price for ith oﬀer, nevertheless accepted volume of ith oﬀer
decreases. The analysis is performed until given ith oﬀer is
rejected. On the basis of ith oﬀer price in the last step (let
us denote the number of the last step by κ∗) the individual
price (piSi or pi
K
i ) for such oﬀer is set.
Parametric pricing rule sets individual prices for each of-
fer. Combined with the BCBT allocation rule constitutes
a mechanism. This mechanism fulﬁlls incentive compat-
ibility property, its results are Pareto-eﬃcient, individual
rationality is also fulﬁlled.
Selling prices set by the parametric pricing rule are not
lesser than buying prices. Thus the budget balance property
does not hold for mechanisms with the parametric pricing
rule.
4.3. Imbalance Reduction
We propose the algorithm to reduce the budget imbalance.
The main idea of this algorithm is to change the stop cri-
terion of the parametric pricing rule. Stop criterion of the
parametric rule generally implies that the parametric anal-
ysis will be carried out until the rejection of given oﬀer.
We propose change of the stop criterion – the analysis will
be carried out until given oﬀer is proﬁtable:
Ii = xi(piSi −S0i ) ∀i∈E , (10)
Ii = xi(E0i −pi
K
i ) ∀i∈D. (11)
However, to perform such algorithm modiﬁcation, we have
to calculate proﬁt for every agent. Equations (10) and (11)
represent the proﬁt of agents. Let us notice, that the rules to
calculate the proﬁts, need to know agents’ types. However,
in the previous sections we have assumed that types are
private knowledge of particular agents. Nevertheless, we
can assume that required value of S0i or E0i (prices that
correspond to the agents’ types) belongs to certain intervals.
Such intervals can be determined on the basis of expert and
common knowledge, historical data, etc. Therefore, let us
assume that these values belong to the following intervals
S0i ∈< S0i ,S
0
i > and E0i ∈< E0i ,E
0
i >.
The main idea of the algorithm for improve the budget
balance is to limit price for particular participants. Lim-
itation of price shall be made by reducing the number of
steps of the parametric analysis. The algorithm retains good
mechanism properties: incentive compatibility, individual
rationality and Pareto-eﬃciency, and reduces the budget
imbalance.
5. Experimental Studies
First, on the simple case study, we show diﬀerences and
similarities between the VCG and the PPR pricing rules.
Next, we present a series of experiments. Such experi-
ments focus on three networks from the SNDlib [17] repos-
itory. On such experiments we compare the imbalance
measure.
5.1. Simple Case Study
The simple case study was performed on the exemplary
four-node network (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Four-node network. Solid lines represent links, dotted
lines represent demands. The notation is following: o:v/p, where
o means oﬀer ID, v means oﬀered bandwidth volume and p means
oﬀer price for unit of the bandwidth.
In Table 1 we can see prices, set by the mechanisms ap-
plying parametric rule and the VCG pricing rule, to particu-
lar agents. We can also see results of allocation rule. Some
of prices are the same for VCG and PPR, some prices are
greater for VCG, some are greater for PPR, nevertheless all
the prices are very similar.
Both mechanisms (applying the parametric pricing rule and
applying the VCG pricing rule) do not meet the budget bal-
ance property. To compare such mechanisms, we propose
the measure – relative budget imbalance ratio Eq. (12).
Proposed measure reﬂects the degree of non-compliance
with budget balance property. The SI is the total seller’s
incomes SI = ∑i∈E Sixi, the BE is the total buyer’s expenses
BE = ∑i∈D Eixi:
RBUT =
SI−BE
SI + BE
. (12)
Relative budget imbalance ratio for the mechanism applying
the parametric pricing rule is equal RBUT = 3.79%, and
64
Pricing Rules Comparison in the Context of Bandwidth Trade
Table 1
Prices comparison for mechanisms applying the parametric pricing rule and VCG pricing rule
Oﬀer Oﬀered vol. Acc. vol. Oﬀer price VCG
Comp.
PPR
Nodes e Se ye xe piSe piSe
– [Mbit/s] [Euro/Mbit/s]
s1 5 2 21 22 = 22
A-B s2 7 7 19 21.57 > 21
s3 4 4 14 21.25 > 21
A-D s4 6 6 20 32.50 > 32
s5 3 3 22 32 = 32
B-D s6 10 6 11 13.33 < 14
B-C s7 7 7 29 30.54 < 31
s8 8 0 32 – –
s9 7 7 17 19.57 < 20
D-C s10 8 8 13 19.75 < 20
s11 5 0 21 – -
d Ed hd xd piKd piKd
– [Mbit/s] [Euro/Mbit/s]
b1 10 10 60 49.80 < 50
A-C b2 15 7 50 47.17 > 47
b3 5 5 70 50 = 50
b4 10 0 40 – –
Fig. 2. Network instances [17]: (a) Polska; (b) dfn-bwin; (c) nobel-us.
for the mechanism applying the VCG pricing rule is equal
to RBUT = 3.64% (see Table 1). We can see, that the
measure is slightly better for mechanism applying the VCG
pricing rule.
5.2. Series of Experiments
Three series of experiments were performed, each con-
tained ten experiments. The experiments concern band-
width trading performed on the networks taken from the
SNDlib library [17]. We analyzed following network in-
stances: Polska, dfn-bwin and nobel-us (Fig. 2). We gen-
erated oﬀers for particular network resources (links and
demands). Oﬀer prices for particular links and demands
was generated on the basis of absolute value of normal
distribution, where mean of the distribution was equal to
distance between end-to-end nodes. The maximal accepted
Table 2
Aggregated relative budget imbalance for the series of
experiments performed on the three backbone networks
Agg. measure VCG PPR
Polska
min 0.28 0.37
RBUT mean 0.33 0.45
max 0.44 0.53
dfn-bwin
min 0.35 0.59
RBUT mean 0.43 0.65
max 0.47 0.73
nobel-us
min 0.34 0.46
RBUT mean 0.38 0.52
max 0.40 0.61
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trade volumes were generated from absolute value of nor-
mal distribution.
In Table 2 we can see aggregated results of the experi-
ments. As we can see, for analyzed cases, the mean value
of the relative budget imbalance is lesser for the VCG pric-
ing rule. Thus, we can state, that the VCG pricing rule
is better than the parametric pricing rule in terms of the
imbalance measure.
6. Summary
In the paper we have analyzed two pricing rules in the
context of the balancing communication bandwidth trade
allocation rule. These pricing rules are the VCG pric-
ing rule and the parametric pricing rule. Both rules have
good properties for multicommodity exchange with infras-
tructure constraints, speciﬁcally for the bandwidth trade.
Both pricing rules have cost for adopting, which results
from budget imbalance. The experiments show, that for
the given data, budget imbalance measure is better for the
VCG pricing rule.
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